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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LAV A BEDS WIND PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; EXERGY 
DEVELOPMENT GROUP OF IDAHO, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company; and XRG 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (Cross-Respondent 
Only), 
Defendants/ Appel )ants/Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
FAGEN, INC., a Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF 
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for the County of Bingham 
The Honorable Darren B. Simpson, presiding. 
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Angelo L. Rosa, ISB #7546 
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
John R. Goodell, ISB #2872 
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(208) 395-0011 Tel. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Second Amended Judgment issued by Judge Darren B. Simpson 
of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for the County of Bingham (the "District Court") as 
well as the decisions entered by the District Court (a) denying Defendants'/Appellants' 
("Appellants") Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance, (b) denying Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the District Court's Order granting Plaintiff/Appellant, Fagen, Inc.'s ("Fagen") 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and (c) granting Fagen's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
All of the foregoing decisions in Fagen's favor constituted an abuse of the District Court's 
discretion. The Court's failure to permit discovery of evidence germane to legitimate defenses 
against Fagen's claims. Instead, the District Court took a punitive attitude to the presentation of 
late-discovered and late-presented evidence, however dispositive such evidence might be. While 
the timing of the presentment of the evidence may not have been preferable, its dispositive nature 
deserved more than the dismissive treatment given it by the District Court. For these reasons, the 
sequence of rulings leading up to and resulting from the judgment entered in Fagen's favor are 
appealed as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule ("I.A.R.") 11 ( a). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fagen filed the present action seeking to recover on breach of contract theory from multiple 
defendants arising out of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction agreement ("EPC") 
covering six (6) wind power generation facilities in the State of Idaho (one located in Bingham 
County, four located in Twin Falls County, and one located in Lincoln County). The EPC was 
executed by Fagen and Defendant/Appellant Exergy Development Group ofldaho, L.L.C. Fagen 
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also filed a lien foreclosure claim. C.T. at 10-26. After various stages of discovery and law and 
motion, Fagen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. C.T. 70. In the months leading up to the 
filing of the Motion, Appellants attempted to schedule the deposition of various Fagen 
representatives. C.T. 445-460. In response, counsel for Appellants deferred to Fagen's main 
counsel in Minnesota for that matter. This Minnesota counsel was not admitted to practice before 
the District Court. Appellants relied in good faith on Fagen's counsel's obligation to produce 
witnesses for deposition, but Fagen never did so. Id. Consequently, Appellants filed a Motion for 
Rule 56(f) Continuance and provided the District Court with supporting affidavits showing why a 
continuance was warranted and identifying Fagen's failure to provide witnesses for deposition. 
C.T. at 445-463. The District Court denied the Motion for Continuance and granted Fagen's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. C.T. 464-473. Appellants and Cross-Respondent, XRG 
Development Partners, LLC, had also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that (a) 
no lien foreclosure cause of action existed, and (b) XRG Development Partners, LLC was not a 
party to any contract, held no interest in any real estate at issue, and was therefore not properly 
named in the action. C.T. at 429-444. The District Court agreed, granted summary judgment in 
XRG Development Partners, LLC's favor and dismissed the meritless lien foreclosure claim filed 
by Fagen as to all Appellants. C.T. at 474-476. 
In the meantime, a parallel action on the same EPC contract was underway in Twin Falls 
County, addressing the other five projects (the "Twin Falls Consolidated Matter"). With summary 
judgment already decided by the District Court in this matter, but given the likelihood of obtaining 
evidence that would establish the legitimacy of Appellants' reasons for seeking a continuance from 
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the District Court in this proceeding, Appellants timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. C.T. 
at 536-538. Appellants also provided proof of the offsets as soon as such proof was available by 
way of discovery in the Twin Falls Consolidated Matter. C.T. 539-554. In the Twin Falls 
Consolidated Matter, Appellants succeeded in that matter in obtaining discovery of key Fagen 
personnel and Fagen, in turn, obtained key testimony from Appellants' principal, Mr. James 
Carkulis ("Mr. Carkulis"). At the hearing on Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, counsel 
for Appellants presented the findings obtained in discovery in the Twin Falls Consolidated Matter 
and the significant bearing it had on a determination of offsets to the damages claimed by Fagen 
in the District Court proceeding. R.T. at pp. 96: 1-99:2. The District Court took the matter under 
advisement along with Fagen's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. R.T. at pp. 99:15-17. 
Subsequently, the Court issued a ruling denying Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration. C.T. at 
571-57 4. The District Court cited as its basis for denying reconsideration the contention that 
Appellants had ample time to conduct discovery but did not do so. Id. By the language of the 
Order it issued, the District Court did not consider the explicit fact that Fagen had been blockading 
discovery (by local counsel deferring to Fagen's lead counsel in Minnesota) and that it was only 
through sheer force of will that Appellants were able to obtain key fact-finding in a compressed 
timeframe in the hopes of being able to demonstrate to the District Court in the Twin Falls 
Consolidated Matter that offsets to damages were appropriate. Id. The District Court also entered 
orders granting Cross-Respondent, XRG Development Partners, LLC an award of fees and costs 
and partially granting Fagen's Motion for Fees and Costs. C.T. at pp. 564-570 and 
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at 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Defendants' Motion 
for a Rule 56(f) Motion. 
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to permit 
reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling on the basis of late-acquired evidence. 
3. If the Court finds the District Court abused its discretion per Questions 1 and 2 
above, whether the Court's an award of attorney's fees and costs in Fagen's favor should 
be similarly reversed. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment and related motions, this Court's standard 
of review is the same as the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Sherer v. Pocatello 
Sch. Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). Further, this Court is 
empowered to review the decisions of the District Court on appeal in this matter according to an 
"abuse of discretion" standard. See Johnson v. N Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 
932 (2012) (applying the standard to motions for reconsideration); Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 
122 Idaho 471,475, 835 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1992) (applying the standard to refusal to consider new 
1 It should also be noted that the Twin Falls Consolidated Matter is also on appeal to this 
Honorable Court and bears Docket No. 42684. The parties to that action stipulated to entry of 
judgment for the express purpose of avoiding the need for trial and with the express 
understanding that an appeal would be taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE UNDER I.R.C.P. 56(F). 
The District Court denied Appellants' right to present all discoverable evidence relevant to 
a response to Fagen's Motion for Summary Judgment. The policy behind I.R.C.P. 56(f) is that 
party should be allowed to complete discovery before being required to respond to a motion for 
summary judgment. See, e.g., Doe v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct.App. 1995). 
Appellants attempted in good faith to schedule depositions over several months with Fagen. That 
discovery was obstructed, with Fagen's counsel of record deferring to his betters in Minnesota, 
who were neither admitted to practice in this action nor had participated substantively in any 
official capacity. Appellants exercised an abundance of good faith (in retrospect, perhaps too 
much good faith) and continued to attempt to schedule depositions of key Fagen personnel, without 
success. C.T. 445-460. After filing its Motion for Summary Judgment, it was clear that Fagen did 
not intend to cooperate with its discovery obligations. Appellants sought the District Court's 
assistance in seeking a continuance by which to conduct essential discovery in this matter that 
would have led to corroboration of Appellants' defenses. C.T. at 445-463. In that Motion, 
Appellants provided the information and affidavits necessary to corroborate certain offsets and the 
need to conduct additional discovery to further establish other defenses. Id. The Court denied the 
Motion on the grounds that Appellants had ample opportunity to conduct discovery. Id. 
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was misguided. 
clearly that when seeking a continuance under Rule 56(f), the moving party "must 'do so in good 
faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and how 
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the 
movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.' " Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 
141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Allen v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1996)). The Court also explained that the 
movant "has the burden of setting out 'what further discovery would reveal that is essential to 
justify their opposition,' making clear 'what information is sought and how it would preclude 
summary judgment."' Id. (quoting Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 
2001)). As this Honorable Court can discern from the record, Appellants' Motion seeking a 
continuance met the aforementioned standard: it was brought in good faith and it identified several 
factors that provided factual substantiation justifying the continuance. Ultimately, those factors 
were proved out in the final stages of discovery in the Twin Falls Consolidated Case. However, 
in the instant case, instead of taking the well-reasoned approach to a factually substantive Motion 
for Continuance that this Court has established, the District Court in this matter punished 
Appellants for relying in good faith on the notion that Fagen and its counsel would cooperate in 
the discovery process. C.T. at 571-574. "Shame on Defendantsfor not filing a motion to compel" 
is essentially the subtext of the Court's ruling. Had the Motion been granted, the necessary fact-
finding--to both support the argument of offsets to damages as well as the facts surrounding the 
later-developed theory that a force majeure event arguably precluded liability in total (as identified 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF 6 
to the court in the Twin Falls Consolidated Matter)-would have been obtained. The telling factor 
in this argument is that the evidence that was permitted to be discovered in the Twin Falls 
Consolidated Matter yielded substantive proof justifying offsets to the amounts due under the EPC, 
and the testimony of Appellant's principal, Mr. James Carkulis, taken in that matter (after a long 
period of unavailability due to medical reasons) substantiated the presence and impact of a force 
majeure event. 
Appellants should not be punished for exercising an abundance of good faith in seeking 
discovery and then asking for a continuance when Fagen refused to provide it. The District Court's 
failure to remedy this deficiency when presented with a substantively and procedurally correct 
motion for continuance constitutes a reversible error that should not be allowed to stand. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION OF ITS RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
This Court considers three factors to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion: 
( 1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles; and (3) 
whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 
Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). As applied to the present facts, the aforementioned 
standard is appropriately analyzed as follows: 
First, the District Court's ruling on Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration evidences its 
cognizance of its discretion in resolving the matter. C.T. at 571-574. 
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to operate within the boundaries its discretion when 
presented with real and substantive evidence that indicated reconsideration of its ruling on 
summary judgment was appropriate. The Court refused to do so, citing the lateness of the evidence 
presented, rather than the substantive nature of the evidence itself. The evidence presented to the 
Court indicated that evidence of force majeure events existed that directly affected the issue of 
liability as well as the offsets identified in the Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance. The Court 
nevertheless ruled that the timing of the evidence was such that consideration of it was improper. 
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence or 
authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order." See PHH 1vfortg. Servs. Corp. v. 
Perreira, 146 Idaho 63L 635,200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. 
First Nat'l Bank c~f N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P .2d 1026, 103 7 (1990) ). However, "a 
motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority." Fragnella 
v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266 (2012). 
In the present case, late-discovered evidence supporting a legitimate defense to Fagen's 
claims was shown. Discovery in the Twin Falls Consolidated Matter revealed additional evidence 
supporting offsets to the billings that gave rise to Fagen' s claim for breach of contract. In addition, 
though not explicitly mentioned on the record in this action, discovery in that matter established 
that a generic PURP A docket filed with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission resulted in a 
moratorium on development of the energy projects contemplated by the EPC that was not 
foreseeable and thus created a force majeure event providing a defense to liability. Appellants 
sought another chance at responding to Fagen's Motion for Summary Judgment. In denying 
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Motion District foreclosed 
legitimate evidence bearing on a full and fair adjudication of this matter, including notably liability 
after further discovery in its sister matter developed further evidence. After the evidence was more 
fully developed, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Court to preserve Appellants' 
rights. C.T. at 536-538. At oral argument on that Motion for Reconsideration, Appellants' counsel 
attempted to persuade the District Court of the necessity of considering this evidence. However, 
after taking the matter under advisement, the District Court denied Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration. C.T. at pp. 571-574. 
Fagen will likely argue that Appellants had access to the evidence indicating the presence 
of evidence such as the force majeure events and could have presented it for the Court's 
consideration. However, the District Court failed to consider (a) the incapacity and unavailability 
of Appellants' key witness, James Carkulis due to illness; (b) Appellants' constant blockading of 
discovery and refusal to provide witnesses for discovery due to constant deference by Idaho 
counsel to Minnesota counsel and Minnesota counsel's delay in providing discovery. Fagen is just 
as likely to claim that Appellants' counsel's stipulation to liability in the sister action (in Twin 
Falls County) was indicia of the lack of a defense. In reality, the full development of offset 
evidence and other evidence (such as the existence of force majeure factors only made possible 
through the participation of Mr. Carkulis in the Twin Falls action) regrettably occurred later than 
the action pending before the District Court would allow for inclusion in the record. Further, the 
parties in the Twin Falls Consolidated Action stipulated to judgment to avoid the necessity of trial 
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on damages explicitly to expedite an appeal the District decisions 
that action. 
Finally, although the record indicates an initial perception that no triable issue of fact 
existed with respect to liability, the after-discovered evidence indicates good cause for setting aside 
whatever might be construed as a stipulation by Appellants regarding the issue of liability. It is 
within sound discretion of a trial court, for good cause shown and in furtherance of justice, to 
relieve a party from a stipulation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 558 P.2d 1071 
(1977). This Honorable Court has also ruled that denial by district court of motion to set aside 
stipulation and reopen case was a matter within sound judicial discretion of that court [See, e.g., 
Loughrey v. Weitzel, 94 Idaho 833, 498 P.2d 1306 (1972)] and that the court has discretion, for 
good cause and to prevent injustice, to relieve parties from stipulation which has been entered into 
through mistake or misunderstanding of fact. See, e.g., Cross v. Moulton, 114 Idaho 884, 761 P.2d 
1236 (Ct. App. 1988). In the present matter, the District Court was advised via Appellants' Motion 
for Reconsideration that evidence existed with respect to offsets to damages. R.T. at pp. 96:1-
99:2. This alone provides a basis for remanding this matter to the District Court. However, given 
the existence of additional evidence relating to liability as discovered in the Twin Falls 
Consolidated Matter (which will be presented during briefing in that matter), Appellants urge this 
Honorable Court to include in any remand order a directive to consider the after-acquired evidence 
bearing on the matter of liability. 
III. REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON FAGEN'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT NECESSITATES V ACTING THE ORDER GRANTING FA GEN'S 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
By virtue of the errors in denying the requested continuance and the request for 
reconsideration, any vacating of the District Court's summary judgment ruling should, by 
extension, vacate the Order granting Fagen's request for attorney's fees and costs. In the event 
this Honorable Court reverses the aforementioned rulings issued by the District Court and remands 
this matter, it is proper that Fagen's Motion for Fees and Costs, which was granted (C.T. at 575-
580) should be reversed for the same reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
While the evidence at issue in the present appeal may have been discovered and/or 
confirmed late in the game, it provides a dispositive effect on the resolution of the issues ofliability 
and damages and the District Court's refusal to consider any of it constitutes and abuse of its 
discretion. Remand to the District Court for review of the issues presented on summary judgment 
in light of the evidence discovered in the Twin Falls Consolidated Matters is necessary and 
mandated by the aforementioned analysis. Accordingly, Appellants respectfully submit that this 
Honorable Court should reverse the District Court's rulings and remand this matter with specific 
instructions relating to these issues. 
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22 5 Submitted, 
Angelqh.Jloef./ 
Attoro"ey for Defendants/ Appellants/Cross-
Respondent 
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